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Since the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU in January 2007, the South 
Caucasus has become a region of direct concern to the EU’s strategy in its wider 
neighbourhood. This study examines the trends affecting EU policies in the South 
Caucasus, with a specific focus on EU–Azerbaijan relations. It argues that in the 
three main areas in which Azerbaijan affects Europe’s interests – cooperation in the 
energy sector, democratisation and conflict resolution – so far the EU has engaged 
well on a regional energy strategy, but less so on democratic reforms and almost 
not at all on conflict settlement in Nagorno Karabakh. The study concludes that the 
EU needs to balance its involvement in all three areas, especially given the deeper 
democratic changes it wishes to see in Azerbaijan, with a list of recommendations 
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EU POLICY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: 
A VIEW FROM AZERBAIJAN 
ELKHAN NURIYEV* 
 
Source: Enlargement of Central Asia and Caucasus Map from the Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, 
  University of Texas at Austin.  
1. Introduction   
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the three newly independent states of the South 
Caucasus – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – have been considered the most strife-ridden 
regions on the European periphery. The European Union appeared on the South Caucasian 
scene in the early 1990s. From the outset, the EU promoted two kinds of security in the region: 
internal security, which is threatened by political tensions and separatist conflicts; and external 
security, which is influenced by geopolitical rivalries and strained relations among regional 
actors. To alleviate the situation, the EU has undertaken diplomatic efforts in conjunction with 
the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe (CoE) and NATO, as well as the Commonwealth of 
                                          
* Dr Elkhan Nuriyev is currently a Professor of Political Science at the Western University in Baku, 
Azerbaijan. He served as a DAAD/OSI Research Fellow at the German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs in 2005–06 and an Alexander von Humboldt Research Fellow at the Peace Research 
Institute in Bonn in 2000–02/2003. He has written extensively on the issues of conflict resolution, energy 
policy, great-power politics and regional security in the Caucasus and Central Asia. His most recent book 
is South Caucasus at the Crossroads: Conflicts, Caspian Oil and Great Power Politics, Hamburg: LIT, 
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Independent States (CIS) and GUAM.
1 EU policy-makers have further realised that a 
coordination policy is needed with each of the principle regional powers. Most importantly, 
effective EU action regarding the South Caucasus and the Caspian basin depends on the level of 
coordination it achieves with Russia, Iran, Turkey and the United States.  
In the post-11 September era, the concept of European integration has gained new momentum in 
the three aspiring democracies of the South Caucasus. Discussions are underway in South 
Caucasian societies about the essential political and economic conditions for closer EU 
integration. A very intense debate focuses on the role the EU can assume in territorial conflicts 
compared with other international security organisations and how the EU can foster regional 
cooperation through aid programmes. Other issues include complementarities and collaboration 
between the EU and other international organisations, such as the UN and OSCE, as well as 
expectations and responses related to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), including the 
matter of regional unity in the South Caucasus. 
Obviously, external influences and renewed rivalries have affected the foreign policy 
orientations and security perceptions of the three South Caucasian countries. The importance of 
the EU relationship differs significantly in each republic, leading to diverging stances on official 
EU integration strategies. While Georgia is endeavouring to move closer to the EU, Azerbaijan 
is giving priority to a phased approach and Armenia currently does not view EU membership as 
a vital element of its foreign policy. The South Caucasian states have not yet become concrete 
candidates for EU membership, nor do they seem to have such prospects in the foreseeable 
future. 
Even so, the EU continues to develop closer political and economic ties with them by means of 
the ENP. The inclusion of these states in the ENP in 2004 signalled the EU’s geopolitical 
interests in this part of the world, although more specific and practical policies are needed. Oil-
rich Azerbaijan deserves special consideration, as a pivotal country with the largest population 
in the region. Today this Muslim state has close contact with the Islamic world, while it is 
simultaneously influenced by neighbouring Christian countries oriented towards Western 
culture. Its position on the junction of the West and East has enabled Azerbaijan to develop a 
synthesis of the values of both cultures.  
How does the EU define its interests in post-Soviet Azerbaijan in political, economic and 
security terms? How does Azerbaijani society perceive the ENP? What factors continue to 
affect the EU’s ability to play a more active role there? And finally, how could the EU 
contribute to stabilisation and democratisation in Azerbaijan? Although this study focuses more 
specifically on the EU–Azerbaijan relationship, it generally examines the strategic trends 
affecting EU policies in the South Caucasus. The study also looks at new elements in the EU’s 
strategy and explores some of the dilemmas and security challenges in the troubled region. 
2.  European Neighbourhood Policy in the regional context 
The incorporation of the South Caucasian countries into the ENP is viewed positively, 
generating hope of a larger EU role in the region. This move sent an important message that the 
EU is committed to supporting the three states on their way towards democratisation and 
                                          
1 GUAM refers to Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. At the most recent GUAM summit on 23–
24 May 2006 in Kyiv, this informal grouping became the Organisation for Democracy and Economic 
Development with headquarters in Ukraine. For further details, see the online news magazine, Civil 
Georgia, 23 May 2006. For more on the history and recent activities of GUAM, see also the following 
websites: http://www.guuam.org (accessed 23.10.2006) and http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
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creating viable market economies. In response, these countries consider the ENP a solid 
opportunity for further EU integration. But it would be mistaken to assume that the EU’s policy 
has changed substantially. The EU still lacks a clear institutional force driving the formulation 
of a strategic vision for the South Caucasus. Nevertheless, the South Caucasus is a significant 
component of EU foreign policy. As discussed in this section, the development and 
implementation of the ENP is important to both sides: the EU will gain more influence through 
the ENP, which in turn will enable the three small states to stabilise their fragile societies and 
forge closer ties with the EU. 
EU strategy and profile of interests 
The EU has some stakes in this volatile region, particularly in terms of energy and security. 
Regional challenges include extremism, separatism and terrorism as well as territorial disputes, 
a regional arms race, environmental concerns and the rise of transnational organised crime. The 
virtually isolated conflict zones such as Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where 
there is no official international presence, have been directly implicated in transnational crime.
2 
Moreover, the unresolved conflicts risk renewed hostilities and new migration flows, thus 
posing a threat to human rights across the South Caucasus. In this context, any kind of regional 
destabilisation may seriously affect security in the EU’s wider neighbourhood.  
On the other hand, there are opportunities related to the energy deposits of the Caspian Sea and 
the role of the South Caucasus as both a resource-rich area and a transit corridor for carrying 
petroleum and gas to Europe, counterweighing dependence on Persian Gulf oil and Russian gas 
supplies. EU member states have increasing economic interests in the region – a potentially 
lucrative and attractive place for foreign direct investment (FDI), especially for multinational oil 
companies. Therefore, conflict resolution should be regarded as a prerequisite for securing 
energy export routes. Internal political stability is another precondition for the development of 
energy and infrastructure projects, both of which are vital for the region.  
The years 1999–2001 saw the politicisation of EU actions in the South Caucasus. EU strategy 
was based on specific policy mechanisms, as set out in the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements (PCAs)
3 concluded with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in June 1999 in 
Luxembourg. The PCAs represented a qualitative breakthrough in EU–South Caucasian 
relations. But at the Luxembourg summit, the three countries were put on notice that the EU 
would not support the status quo with generous amounts of aid – EU action and assistance were 
to be viewed as incentives for positive change. As a result, EU activities in the South Caucasus 
reinforced political dialogue with the young states, supported the OSCE in conflict areas by 
funding small-scale rehabilitation programmes, helped the OSCE to monitor sections of the 
Georgian–Russian border and declared its willingness to support large-scale rehabilitation in the 
event of an Armenian–Azerbaijani settlement.  
Yet during this period, the EU did not act coherently in developing a more concrete vision for 
the South Caucasus. Despite calls from the European Parliament for firmer engagement, 
                                          
2 In essence, the consequences of transnational crime in the South Caucasus, which is a natural conduit 
for trafficking, smuggling and the drug trade, affect both the region and Europe. On several occasions, 
Azerbaijani and Georgian officials have expressed concerns over the use of separatist areas in the drug 
trade and other kinds of transnational crime. On this issue, see the Zerkalo newspaper, 20 July 2002 and 
the BBC Monitoring Global Newsline FSU Political File, 9 February 2002. 
3 The PCAs represent the basic framework for EU relations with the three states. All of the Commission 
documents relating to the PCAs are available on the European Commission’s website – see “The EU’s 
Relationship with the Countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia” (retrieved from 
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member states did not succeed in further elaborating EU policy. Although the EU retained an 
overall strategy for the region, specific EU member states had clearer agendas with the 
possibility of adopting a concerted approach under the common foreign and security policy 
(CFSP). In early 2001, pressures increased for a major review of EU policy mechanisms in the 
region. At that time, the then Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten and the late 
Anna Lindh, the former Swedish foreign minister, published a joint article affirming that “the 
EU cannot afford to neglect the Southern Caucasus”, and pledging a more robust EU role in 
helping to resolve the territorial conflicts.
4 Under this impetus, the EU took a number of 
measures to enhance political dialogue with the three states and expressed readiness to play a 
more active part in backing mediation efforts. 
Unsurprisingly, the tragic events of 11 September 2001 brought changes to EU policy, in which 
the EU effectively redefined its stance towards the South Caucasus. EU officials have 
repeatedly visited the three states to examine progress in their political and economic transitions 
and their implementation of the PCAs. The appointment of an EU special representative 
(EUSR) in July 2003 was another important move.
5 More practically, at the EU summit in 
Dublin in June 2004 the three states were integrated into the ENP,
6 signing individual Action 
Plans at the end of 2006.
7 The implementation of EU rules and institutions in the three countries 
will take years, and depends mainly upon the ability and readiness of these nations to 
incorporate them. The EU is keen to see a credible and sustained commitment to market reforms 
and democracy, clearly reflected in tangible progress. In the context of the ENP, the EU offers 
the prospect of further economic integration and launches a new phase of development in closer 
relations with these young states. 
Certainly, the inclusion of these countries in the ENP points to increased EU visibility and 
engagement in this post-Soviet territory. The ENP also offers a marvellous opportunity for these 
states to develop their interregional relations. As yet, much depends on the ability of the South 
Caucasian societies to transform the ENP from a mere concept into an effective model of 
cooperation. But the main questions are whether the ENP will substantially advance the 
relations between these states and the EU and whether the EU should apply individual or 
regional approaches towards the three countries. The EU seems to provide them with equal 
opportunities, and Brussels is watching how they manage to exploit these. 
 
                                          
4 Even prior to 11 September, the position of the South Caucasus as a strategic corridor linking southern 
Europe with Central Asia and its endowment of rich hydrocarbon resources led to the view among EU 
policy-makers that oil and gas development projects there could help secure world energy supplies in the 
future. On this point, see the Financial Times, 20 February 2001. 
5 Based on the European Council Decision (11027/03) of 7 July 2003, the EU created the EUSR post for 
the South Caucasus. The role was first filled by Finnish diplomat Heikki Talvitie in early July 2003. The 
mandate of the EUSR involves encouraging the three countries to cooperate on themes of common 
interest such as security threats and the fight against terrorism, and to prepare for a return to peace and 
stability in the region. Another objective of the EUSR is to better support conflict-resolution efforts, but 
without direct involvement in the mediation process currently under the aegis of the UN and the OSCE. 
For details, see European Council, Joint Action 2003/496/CFSP of 3 July 2003 concerning the 
appointment of an EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, OJ L 169/74 – L 169/75, 
08.07.2003. 
6 More information about the ENP is available on the European Commission’s website 
(http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm; accessed 23 October 2006). 
7 On 14 November 2006, Action Plans under the ENP were officially signed in Brussels between the EU 
and Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. For further details, see the European Commission’s website 
(http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm#3, accessed 22 January 2007). EU POLICY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: A VIEW FROM AZERBAIJAN | 5 
 
South Caucasian states and different security perceptions 
In the early 1990s, there was much the debate among Western policy-makers on the degree to 
which the South Caucasus is European and particularly whether the three newly independent 
states belong to the European community of nations. With the admission of Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia into the CoE, they became an integral part of the European family, 
closing the debate. In effect, CoE membership is a significant step towards integration into 
European structures, although politically the incorporation of these states into the ENP more 
clearly illustrated the view that events in the region have the potential to impact wider European 
security.  
Still, the different security perceptions of the three post-Soviet states are key obstacles in 
forging closer relations with the EU and with each other in the interest of regional stability. 
Their varying orientations make economic cooperation less straightforward and undermine 
regional unity, negatively affecting relations at the EU–South Caucasus level. All three 
countries seek security, but their security concerns differ vastly.
8 While Armenia retains 
stronger ties with Russia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are striving to expand their roles in the 
framework of internationally-sponsored economic projects, and have a greater tendency to see 
their future security as based on regional economic cooperation. 
Armenia relies heavily on its special alliance with Russia because of its hostile relationship with 
Turkey and the ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh. Russia is seen as its 
only security guarantor and Moscow in turn regards this tiny republic as a key strategic ally in 
the region. Armenia has therefore followed a pro-Russian foreign policy since its independence. 
Armenia’s other geopolitical partner is Iran, a counterweight to Turkish influence in the region. 
Despite Armenia’s intensifying relations with Russia and Iran, Armenian–US interaction is 
developing too (although Armenia has always sought to balance its ties with the US through 
very strong links to Russia and Iran).
9 By maintaining extensive links with France, Armenia is 
also politically active in the European sphere. Even though Yerevan is cautious with regard to 
closer cooperation with Euro-Atlantic structures, Armenia has become a major recipient of 
international assistance in the post-Soviet transition period.  
For Azerbaijan, the restoration of territorial integrity and the resolution of the Armenian–
Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno Karabakh are the country’s chief foreign policy concerns. 
With respect to external regional powers, Azerbaijan enjoys warm relations with the West, 
Russia and Iran, officially pursuing an even-handed approach in trying to satisfy their interests. 
The results of an opinion poll recently conducted by the Baku-based website Day.az, showed 
that 34.9% of 1,714 respondents supported a balanced foreign policy orientation for the country, 
while 22.1% expressed their support for an orientation towards Europe, 14.6% towards the CIS, 
                                          
8 More specifically, in the recent past both Georgia and Azerbaijan have suffered invasions by Russian 
troops (respectively in April 1989 and in January 1990), who sought to repress the democratic movements 
in both countries. These two countries have suffered bloody wars with more powerful adversaries as well 
as several coups d’etats, which repeatedly threatened their sovereignty and territorial integrity. In 
addition, Georgia and Azerbaijan are ethnically diverse states that are vulnerable to Russian manipulation. 
All of these factors and the unresolved conflicts in Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have 
made the fates of these two Caucasian countries very similar. Compared with Georgia and Azerbaijan, 
Armenia became the most homogeneous former Soviet republic after large numbers of ethnic minorities, 
mainly Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Jews and Russians, fled in 1988–94. For more details, see E. Nuriyev, The 
Post-Soviet Caucasus within New Geopolitical Framework: Towards Conflict or Peace?, Working Paper 
No. 3/2000, Arbeitsstelle Friedensforschung Bonn, Bonn, November 2000. 
9 Derived from private communication with an Armenian political scientist who requested anonymity, 
Yerevan, 26 February 2002. 6 | ELKHAN NURIYEV 
 
12.6% towards Turkey, 12.1% towards the US and only 3.7% towards Iran.
10 But Russia and 
Iran still regard Azerbaijan’s endeavours to enlarge cooperation with Euro-Atlantic structures as 
a potent challenge. Iran’s aggressive stance against Azerbaijan
11 in the Caspian Sea in 2001 
substantively reinforced Azerbaijani–Turkish relations.
12 Wide-ranging cooperation with 
Western democracies also holds a special place in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. The launch of 
several international energy projects has stimulated further investment in Azerbaijan’s oil 
industry. To date, Azerbaijan’s interaction with both the US and the EU has extended to many 
areas but primarily to the political and economic spheres. 
For Georgia, a strong European orientation is a main priority for the country’s foreign policy. 
Since independence, Georgia has advocated a westward-looking strategy, seeing its future as a 
key transit country for oil, gas and commerce between Europe and Central Asia and the South 
Caucasus. Georgia has focused much effort on expanding the country’s participation in Euro-
Atlantic structures. Compared with Armenia, Georgia’s relationship with Azerbaijan and 
Turkey has grown much closer, and all three neighbours have developed strategic cooperation in 
the energy, transportation, political, economic and military domains. Meanwhile, Georgia’s 
relations with Russia in recent years have been very problematic, as most Georgians regard 
Russia as an imperial power seeking to undermine their statehood.
13 Tbilisi accuses Moscow of 
supporting secessionist regimes in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Fearing a loss of power in 
Georgia, Russia is attempting to hinder Georgia’s closer alignment with Western democracies. 
Moscow has repeatedly cut off gas and energy supplies,
14 stalled peace talks on Abkhazia, 
delayed negotiations for the removal of Russian military bases,
15 and imposed a discriminatory 
visa regime that exempts breakaway regions in Georgia from normal visa requirements.
16 The 
most recent and noteworthy change in Georgia’s foreign policy is that the country’s leadership 
has been looking for external security guarantees, mainly requesting Western aid in military and 
security sectors. 
Lately, the inequality in the three Caucasian countries’ preparedness to cooperate more fully 
with Euro-Atlantic structures has impeded efforts to resolve regional security issues. While the 
ruling elites have declared their commitment to a closer alliance with the EU, they do not seem 
to invest sufficient effort towards reaching that goal. At the same time, the absence of a 
                                          
10 Further details are available on the Today.az website, Poll Archive (in Russian) (http://www.day.az; 
accessed 8 November 2006). 
11 In July 2001, tensions between Baku and Tehran reached their peak because of the regular violation of 
Azerbaijan’s air space by Iranian jet fighters and Iranian naval forces’ attacks on an Azerbaijani oil 
exploration ship in the Caspian Sea (see RFE/RL Newsline, 26 July 2001). 
12 Baku views Turkey’s presence as a stabilising factor in the region, and strongly welcomes Turkish 
military involvement in the reformation of the Azerbaijani army in accordance with NATO standards.  
13 Derived from a private conversation with a Georgian diplomat who requested anonymity, Vienna, 
August 2002. 
14 Georgian–Russian tensions have steadily grown in recent years. The situation particularly worsened 
after the escalation of Russia’s trade war with Georgia in 2006. For details, see the online magazine Civil 
Georgia, 5–6 May 2006. 
15 Following Russian–Georgian talks on 30 May 2005 in Moscow, Russia agreed to shut down its military 
bases in Georgia by 2008, and signed a joint communiqué outlining phased withdrawal from the two 
bases, first from Akhalkalaki and then from Batumi. In late March 2006, Russian and Georgian defence 
officials signed major agreements on the timeframe, modalities and rules for the withdrawal and on the 
transit of Russian military personnel and cargo via Georgia. For details, see RFE/RL Newsline, 31 May 
2005; see also Civil Georgia, 30–31 May 2005 and also Civil Georgia, 31 March 2006. 
16 Periodically, Moscow takes steps to provide Russian citizenship to residents of the secessionist areas of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. EU POLICY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: A VIEW FROM AZERBAIJAN | 7 
 
consistent EU strategy for the South Caucasus, along with the lack of resources and active 
coordination with other international organisations for resolving regional conflicts has led to 
some perceived ambiguity on the part of the EU in this respect. Still, the three countries have 
often reaffirmed their general EU orientations and each has built its own bridge to Europe, with 
Azerbaijan exploiting its energy resources, Georgia making use of its traditional Western-
oriented elite and Armenia bringing its wealthy diaspora into play.  
Interestingly, religion does not seem to play a major role in shaping the foreign policies of the 
South Caucasian states. Muslim Azerbaijan cooperates closely with Christian Georgia and the 
two countries have successfully built a strategic partnership in the energy field. Christian 
Armenia has lucratively broadened its energy, trade and economic relations with the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and in recent years the two neighbours have developed mutually beneficial 
projects. Thus, neither religious nor political factors but economic ones appear to be 
predominant in these ties. 
On the internal security front, these aspiring democracies still have much to do in the economic 
sphere to replace their largely corrupt mixtures of command systems governed by mafia 
structures with functioning, viable market economies ruled by law. 
3.  Why Azerbaijan matters 
Sixteen years after the break-up of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan continues to adjust to the 
responsibilities of an independent state. Given both the complexity of the geopolitical 
environment and the lack of political experience to cope effectively with new challenges, it is 
not likely that Azerbaijan will successfully exploit its economic advantages and achieve its 
strategic goals without strong support from the world community. Since independence, the 
governments of the US, the UK, Germany, Japan, Norway, Canada, Switzerland and Italy have 
been instrumental in helping to solve problems that are important to the Azerbaijani population. 
Major international donors in Azerbaijan have implemented various programmes in recent years 
aimed at cultivating a democratic society and an open market economy. Moreover, Azerbaijan 
also receives solid political backing from most of the world and within international 
organisations, as it endeavours to restore territorial integrity and consolidate national 
sovereignty.  
Despite the myriad of problems, including a lack of good governance and an effective fight 
against corruption, Azerbaijan still matters. This section discusses three major factors that make 
Azerbaijan a special case: its energy resources, the contribution of a settlement over Nagorno 
Karabakh to regional stability and democratisation through profound reform.   
Caspian pipeline politics and energy security 
Since the early 1990s, Azerbaijan’s geo-strategic location and resource-provider role in the 
pipeline game has had growing implications for Europe in terms of energy and economic 
security. Azerbaijan’s perceived willingness to cooperate closely with the enlarged Euro-
Atlantic alliance has attracted an unprecedented level of international attention for the country. 
The country’s energy wealth constitutes an important counterpoint to the volatile Persian Gulf 
for Western democracies, which will help Europe to diversify its energy imports.  8 | ELKHAN NURIYEV 
 
In recent years, Azerbaijan’s economy has shown considerable signs of recovery, encouraged by 
the comparative stability engendered by the late Heydar Aliyev presidency.
17 Likewise, the 
incumbent President Ilham Aliyev has so far managed to maintain domestic stability and 
improve the socio-economic situation, especially following the presidential elections in 2003 
and the parliamentary ballot in 2005.
18 The coming years will bring considerable oil and gas 
revenues to Azerbaijan’s economy given its re-emergence as a pivotal Caspian oil supplier. In 
addition, the newly inaugurated Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, mainly built to relieve 
the Western world’s oil dependency on the Middle East, underscores Azerbaijan’s geopolitical 
importance for the European market. It also gives the country more control over its own destiny 
by providing strategic alternatives to Russia. 
As an energy supplier, in 2006 Azerbaijan was already exporting some 1.2 million tonnes of 
crude oil to Europe via the Russian port of Novorossiysk. In addition, some 10 million tonnes of 
Azeri oil were transported to Europe in 2006 via the BTC route. By early April 2007, the BTC 
project had pumped approximately 14 million tonnes of crude to the Mediterranean. As time 
goes by, the BTC pipeline is set to increase the mutual interdependence of the EU and 
Azerbaijan dramatically. The pipeline has a projected lifespan of 40 years. Currently working at 
normal capacity, the BTC pipeline is already capable of exporting maximum 50 million tonnes 
of oil per year to the European market.
19  
At this point, the obvious European interests in the Caspian basin are to preserve the security of 
European energy supplies and prevent the monopolisation of oil resources by any one powerful 
country. As the BTC pipeline brings more Azerbaijani crude oil into the European energy 
system, any real risk of an interruption or break in supplies would have an immediate impact on 
European consumers and possibly even affect oil prices in global markets. The pipeline runs 
close to the conflict zones where the separatist regimes and various rebel groups, including the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party, have threatened to target the regional pipeline network if their 
demands are not met. This risk could pose a potentially destabilising effect on European 
markets. Although the US will consume little oil from the Caspian basin and the EU has far 
more interests at stake, EU efforts are scant compared with those of the US. The US has given 
substantial support to the BTC construction project and has made it clear that America wants to 
ensure a military presence in this geo-strategic territory. In all probability, while most of the 
pipeline is buried and thus harder to attack, the BTC will require constant guard to prevent 
sabotage. The necessity of increasing the EU’s political and economic investment in the 
stability and security of the region will inevitably grow stronger. 
Another important energy transit, the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum (BTE) pipeline, runs parallel to the 
BTC and will carry natural gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field
20 to Georgia and then to 
                                          
17 The late President Heydar Aliyev was very successful in attracting international petroleum giants to 
invest heavily in the Azeri energy sector. He was able to formulate a new oil strategy and involve 
Azerbaijan in many international projects and trans-regional programmes. During his presidency, 
Azerbaijan signed a series of oil and gas agreements that made the country a new regional player in 
international energy politics. See E. Nuriyev, The South Caucasus at the Crossroads: Conflicts, Caspian 
Oil and Great Power Politics, Hamburg: LIT, 2007. 
18 For details on this issue, see E. Nuriyev, Wahlen in Aserbaidschan: Innenpolitische Machtkämpfe und 
Strategische Interessen der Großmächte, SWP-Aktuell No. 55, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, 
December 2005. 
19 Derived from personal communication with Richard Pegge of British Petroleum, Baku, 27 June 2007. 
20 The Shah Deniz gas and condensate field is located in the Caspian Sea, approximately 100 kilometres 
southeast of Baku. For details, see Energy Information Administration, “Azerbaijan”, Country Analysis 
Briefs, US Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., August 2006 (retrieved from 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Azerbaijan/NaturalGas.html; accessed 8 November 2006). EU POLICY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: A VIEW FROM AZERBAIJAN | 9 
 
Turkey, where it will connect to the Turkish gas network through which Azerbaijan can deliver 
natural gas all over Europe. The newly commissioned BTE (also known as the South Caucasus 
Gas Pipeline) is expected to be operational by late summer 2007. The contracted capacity of the 
BTE pipeline is currently 7.2 billion cubic metres (bcm).
21 Recently, Georgia signed a deal to 
buy Azeri natural gas and Turkey is committed to doing the same.
22 Baku is currently 
conducting negotiations with Greece and talks may extend further to the Balkans and even to 
Central European countries, which constitute a serious market for gas. Azerbaijan’s natural gas 
production from the Shah Deniz field will rise sharply in the next few years, the scale of which 
is not only expected to make the country self-supporting in natural gas but also to result in 
substantial export revenues and position the country as a major gas exporter from the Caspian 
basin. 
What is more, resource-rich Azerbaijan forms a transit hub in an evolving geo-strategic and 
geo-economic system that stretches from Europe to the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The 
country provides another route for transporting Caspian energy supplies to European member 
states, some of which are increasingly dependent on Russian gas. Most notably, Germany and 
France are reliant on Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned monopolistic company. Given that the 
majority of European countries’ natural gas demand is expected to burgeon in the near future, 
the prospective alternative could be a trans-Caspian pipeline carrying natural gas to Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Turkey and then to Central Europe. Despite the new energy deal signed on 12 May 
2007 between Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan for a rival Caspian gas pipeline, Turkmen 
President Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedov specifically indicated that the trans-Caspian pipeline 
project had not been cancelled. Moreover, the recent announcement on the possible joint 
exploration of an offshore Caspian Sea field, named Kapaz by Azerbaijan and Serdar by 
Turkmenistan, and the two countries’ willingness to investigate the proposed export option keep 
construction plans alive. Both the EU and the US have used the promising rapprochement to 
resume lobbying for the trans-Caspian gas pipeline between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, 
seeing it as a vital energy link to the European market.
23 Perhaps, the special case of the shared, 
offshore Caspian field is the most plausible source of gas for Azerbaijan to transit, but it largely 
depends on a demarcation agreement, which so far has not been signed between the Caspian 
littoral states.  
 
                                          
21 The first phase of the South Caucasus Pipeline project envisages a total capacity of 7.6 bcm per year. 
The BTE pipeline capacity can be increased in the second phase up to 20 bcm per year (data derived from 
personal communication with Richard Pegge of British Petroleum, Baku, 27 June 2007). For details about 
the BTE pipeline, also see the website for the Energy Information Administration 
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Caspian/ExportIssues.html and http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/ 
Azerbaijan/NaturalGas.html; accessed 13 November 2006). 
22 See the Caspian News Agency, 28 February 2003; see also N. Guliev and R. Abbasov, “Azerbaijan: 
Gas Pipeline Under Fire”, IWPR Caucasus Reporting Service, CRS No. 183, Institute for War & Peace 
Reporting, London, 13 June 2003. 
23 The problem of the trans-Caspian gas pipeline route has long been under discussion. While visiting 
Azerbaijan in early June 2007, US Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza emphasised that   
transportation of natural gas from Turkmenistan to European markets via a trans-Caspian pipeline route 
would be “50 percent cheaper” than via the proposed route linking Turkmenistan with Kazakhstan and 
Russia. In this regard, the materialisation of a trans-Caspian gas pipeline will help diversify supplies and 
restrain prices, thus ensuring Europe’s energy security and protecting the EU from a Russian monopoly. 
For more details on this issue, see “Putin Deal Torpedoes Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline Plans”, New 
Europe, The European Weekly, Belgium, 17 May 2007; see also Interfax, 13 May 2007; RFE/RL 
Newsline, 13 May 2007; APA, 12 June 2007; Zerkalo, 3 May 2006.   10 | ELKHAN NURIYEV 
 
The Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno Karabakh 
Another reason Azerbaijan matters to the EU relates to the protracted, ‘frozen’ conflict in 
Nagorno Karabakh,
24 the peaceful resolution of which is indeed in Europe’s interest. The 
conflict is often wrongly called ‘frozen’: the conflict itself is alive, since people are still dying in 
sporadic fighting at the ceasefire line. What is ‘frozen’ though, unfortunately, is the peace 
process. Being the longest-running dispute in the CIS space, this 18-year-old Armenian–
Azerbaijani conflict poses a vexing problem for the architects of European security. Recently, 
Western democracies voiced concern over the possible use of the Armenian-occupied territories 
of Azerbaijan in the drug trade. In fact, the point of entry is the border between Iran and the 
occupied territories of Azerbaijan, from where drugs transit Armenia towards Georgia or Russia 
and then on to Central Europe.
25 Furthermore, this territorial conflict continues to prevent 
security cooperation and impede economic development across the region. The current situation 
of no war, yet no peace in the conflict zone and the heavy burden of many hundreds of 
thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) play a crucial role in Azerbaijan’s 
political instability.  
Many attempts have been made to resolve the conflict through negotiations. The OSCE Minsk 
Group has made some strides towards a lasting peace. In recent years, the presidents of Armenia 
and Azerbaijan have met a number of times and fighting has subsided. Currently, peace talks 
continue in the framework of the Prague process, with the foreign ministers of the two countries 
meeting regularly for political consultations under the mediation of the OSCE Minsk Group. In 
the last round of negotiations between Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers in 
November 2006, both sides tried to find some common ground.
26 The two ministers met again 
on 23 January 2007 in Moscow to resume intensive discussions on a peaceful settlement.
27 New 
summits are scheduled for the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents, who have yet to discuss the 
pivotal issues for resolving the conflict. So far, the confidentiality of the negotiations and 
increased efforts by some key European organisations have provided fertile ground for new 
speculations. Many in Baku and Yerevan hope for a breakthrough; however, one of the 
awkward issues concerning a quick resolution is how to prepare public opinion for compromise 
in both societies, given disagreement about what a just resolution entails.  
Consequently, the fate of Nagorno Karabakh has yet to be determined. With citizens in Armenia 
and Azerbaijan highly sensitive to the terms of any future peace agreement, relations between 
the two neighbours remain strained. If the peace process brings no results in the near future, a 
renewed war may be triggered, for example under the pretext of pursuing retribution for 
incidents on the front line between Armenian and Azeri forces. The regional implications of 
renewed warfare are immense, as several powerful players, most notably Russia and Turkey, are 
tied militarily to the two small states. The lack of progress in finding an enduring solution to 
this conflict is a worrying and destabilising factor that continues to impact wider European 
security and calls for far greater efforts by the European security organisations. Much will also 
depend on how successfully EU institutions develop multilateral cooperation with the OSCE 
and the CoE and create new possibilities for enhancing constructive dialogue. 
                                          
24 While de jure part of Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh is also claimed by Armenia. The territory is 
largely populated by Armenians who themselves proclaimed a self-styled ‘independent’ republic in 1991, 
which did not receive international recognition. In the early 1990s, Armenian troops took control of 
Nagorno Karabakh as well as seven predominately Azeri-populated districts on its perimeter. So far, these 
lands have remained occupied by Armenian forces. 
25 See Zerkalo, 20 July 2002. 
26 See Trend, 15 November 2006. 
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Promoting democratisation through reform  
The development of democracy, good governance and an open society is an additional problem 
Azerbaijan has been facing since regaining independence in 1991. Azerbaijanis are proud that 
they established the first democracy in the Muslim world as far back as 1918.
28 Modern 
Azerbaijan is a proving ground where tools and models for breaking old stereotypes and 
establishing new democratic values are being tested. This secular Muslim country aspires to 
build democratic institutions and create a market economy. Major European organisations such 
as the OSCE and the CoE are keeping watch over the democratic processes underway. On 
several occasions, Europe’s leading institutions have criticised the incumbent authorities for 
their failure to adequately protect human rights and foster an independent media, as well as for 
lack of progress in eradicating the rampant corruption and bribery in state-owned institutions. 
Although European observers acknowledged some improvements during the parliamentary 
ballot in 2005, they generally emphasised that the vote did not meet international standards for 
democratic elections.
29   
Notwithstanding some serious impediments, Azerbaijan can still attain a true democracy, as 
Azeri society is prone to evolutionary democratic change. Certainly, the EU can add unique 
value in promoting the country’s democratic transition, but EU relations and cooperation with 
Azerbaijan are partly going to be determined by the advances made by the authorities in Baku 
towards political and economic transformation. Even with its oil and gas riches, Azerbaijan will 
be unable to move closer to the EU without a series of radical reforms, notably in law 
enforcement, industrial monopolies, human rights and the judicial system. Success in 
developing democratic standards and a market economy in Azerbaijan could serve as a model 
for diffusing similar reforms across the post-Soviet Muslim states of Central Asia, particularly 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – creating a new ‘corridor of 
democratic values’ that would add to the security and stability of Eurasia as the whole.  
4. EU–Azerbaijan  relations 
Azerbaijan’s geographical location at the crossroads of Eurasia stimulates interest by the EU, 
which offers Azerbaijan a broad spectrum of opportunities for progressive integration into the 
European market. Azerbaijan places partnership and cooperation with the EU among its 
principle foreign policy priorities. This section considers all-round interaction between the two 
parties, analysing the main advantages and obstacles associated with closer relations. 
                                          
28 An orientation towards political democracy in Azerbaijan was evident during the period 1918–20, when 
the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) was established on 28 May 1918. The ADR was recognised 
by the League of Nations and had a wide spectrum of democratic freedoms, political pluralism and 
multiparty structures of power. The ADR was also first among Muslim states to use the Latin alphabet 
instead of Arabic script. The democratic development of Azerbaijani society was forcibly disrupted on 28 
April 1920, when Russia’s 11
th Red Army invaded Azerbaijan and the Bolsheviks overthrew the 
democratic administration. For details, see A. Balayev, Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (in Russian), 
Baku: Elm, 1991; see also A. Balayev, Azerbaijani National Movement in 1917–1918 (in Russian), Baku: 
Elm, 1998; and also T. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920: The Shaping of National Identity 
in a Muslim Community, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
29 For more on this issue, see OSCE, “Elections in Azerbaijan did not meet international standards despite 
some improvements”, Press Release, OSCE, Warsaw, 7 November 2005 (retrieved from 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/item_1_16887.html?print=1; accessed 12 November 2006); see also 
OSCE/ODIHR, Final Report on the Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan, OSCE/ODIHR, Vienna, 1 
February 2006 (retrieved from http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/15649.html; accessed 12 November 
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Political relations, economic prospects and trade cooperation 
The entry into force of the PCA in June 1999 set the legal framework for EU–Azerbaijan 
political relations. In effect, the PCA offers Azerbaijan comprehensive cooperation in all non-
military spheres, encompassing political dialogue, trade, investment and economic relations, 
and legislative and cultural interaction. Regular political dialogue between the two sides occurs 
at senior official levels. As early as 1998, the European Commission (EC) nominated a special 
envoy to Azerbaijan. In turn, Baku established a permanent mission to the EU in 2000. A year 
earlier, in 1999, to help implement the PCA, the late President Heydar Aliyev established a 
State Commission on Partnership and Cooperation with the EU. In the summer of 2005, the 
incumbent President Ilham Aliyev issued a new decree re-establishing a State Commission on 
European Integration. 
Following the appointment of Heikki Talvitie as the first EUSR for the South Caucasus, the EU 
bolstered its political ties with Azerbaijan and began to play a more active role in the region. 
From mid-2003 to early 2006, Mr Talvitie frequently visited Azerbaijan and mainly tried to 
assist the country with undertaking political and economic reforms. He gave attention to conflict 
resolution in Nagorno Karabakh, constantly discussing the matter with the Azerbaijani 
leadership. During Mr Talvitie’s term in office, President Aliyev visited Brussels in May 2004, 
and EU Commissioner Janez Potocnik and President Romano Prodi travelled to Azerbaijan later 
that year. Most importantly, the inclusion of Azerbaijan (together with Armenia and Georgia) in 
the ENP was a crucial step forward, signifying new prospects for cooperation. 
Progress on economic and political reforms was assessed by the EU in a special report in March 
2005.
30 Another report, by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 
highlighted Azerbaijan’s growth rate of 26%, making it one of the world’s fastest growing 
economies thanks to its oil sector and the BTC pipeline.
31 Major European companies have 
invested in Azerbaijan’s energy sector; several oil giants, such as British Petroleum, Total Fina 
Elf and Statoil have signed partnership agreements with the country, coinciding with the 
expanding presence of some EU member states. The pipeline developments have helped 
reinforce the perception of Azerbaijan as a reliable energy partner and bolstered its economic 
cooperation with Western democracies.  
In recent years, Azerbaijan has received high levels of FDI, although the benefits have yet to 
trickle across the country, with the western districts having the lowest levels of income and the 
highest rates of poverty.
32 Beyond doubt, inflows of FDI into the petroleum sector lead to 
favourable spillover effects on other sectors – but only if Azerbaijan can manage monetary 
fluctuations linked with increases in oil export revenues.  
Nevertheless, there is cautious optimism regarding the future of Azerbaijan’s economy, despite 
its extreme dependence on the oil sector for its long-term welfare. There are many reasons to 
                                          
30 See European Commission, “European Neighbourhood Policy”, Country Report, Azerbaijan, 
Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2005), 286/3, Brussels, 2 March 2005 (retrieved from 
ttp://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/azerbaijan_country_report_2005_en.pdf; accessed 20 November 
2006). 
31 With reference to the statement by the Baku office of the EBRD, the Baku news agency Trend reported 
that by comparison Azerbaijan is ahead of economic growth rates among EU member states and the 
countries of North American Free Trade Association. See Trend, 14 November 2006; see also European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Transition Report 2006: Finance in Transition, 
EBRD, London, November 2006 (retrieved from http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/6813.htm; accessed 
20 November 2006). 
32 See International Monetary Fund (IMF), Azerbaijan Republic: Selected Issues, Country Report No. 
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believe that Azerbaijan will join the ranks of Norway rather than Nigeria in terms of managing 
its oil wealth. The country’s access to international energy markets via the BTC and BTE 
pipelines is unique. Even after projected falls in oil and gas income (probably between 2010 and 
2015), Azerbaijan will continue to profit from pipeline transit revenues. Azeri authorities know 
well that their initiatives to prepare for mass inflows of oil revenues could help them avoid the 
‘Dutch disease’ and its related effects on the economy. But the fact that the country is 
increasingly less reliant on foreign petroleum corporations and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) loans has raised concerns about whether the near future holds any strong incentives for 
economic reform. Clearly, a continued push towards a market economy is essential, and the EU 
attaches much importance to the creation of a liberal business climate in Azerbaijan. It can be 
hoped that the ruling elite in Baku realises that continuing efforts to reform the economy and 
expand the non-oil sectors will help the country to cope successfully with the next phase of 
economic transition. 
Energy security is gaining prominence on the EU agenda as previously noted and it is likely to 
guide the EU’s relations with Azerbaijan in the coming years. More recently, EC and 
Azerbaijani officials have begun talks on Azerbaijan’s involvement in energy security projects 
supported by the EU, scheduled to start at the end of 2007.
33 President Aliyev’s meetings in 
November 2006 with EC President Jose Manuel Barroso, EU High Representative for CFSP 
Javier Solana, President of the European Parliament Josep Borrell Fontelles, EU Commissioner 
for Energy Andris Piebalgs and other officials in Brussels opened a new chapter in bilateral 
relations. The two sides signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Brussels on 7 
November 2006 on the strategic energy partnership between the EU and Azerbaijan.
34 In a 
recent interview, Mr Solana underscored the importance of the energy accord, which will 
enhance Azerbaijan’s cooperation with the EU at the strategic level.
35  
Although their trade cooperation primarily deals with oil and gas, since regaining independence 
Azerbaijan has become the EU’s largest trade partner in the South Caucasus. By overall 
comparison with the CIS countries, Azerbaijan’s total trade with the EU has grown steadily over 
the past several years. The development of the Transport Corridor for Europe, Caucasus and 
Asia (TRACECA) will underpin economic diversification and future economic growth. Early 
on, Azerbaijan asked the EU to support its application to join the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). The EU responded with assistance for WTO membership preparation under the TACIS 
programme. Negotiations on market access are underway based on revised offers in goods and 
services.
36 More recently, the two sides have held talks under the ENP on deepening trade, with 
further projects having the potential to enhance Azerbaijan’s integration into the EU market. 
At the same time, the EU wants to see credible, sustained commitment to reforms in the wider 
social and political spheres, where the consolidation of democratic values and the respect for 
human rights remain paramount. In principle, Azerbaijan has succeeded somewhat in adopting 
international standards of democracy, an open society and good governance. The country has 
been less successful in implementing Western norms of democratic governance, civil rights and 
                                          
33 See APA, 18 January 2007. 
34 See AzerTag, Azerbaijan’s state-owned news agency, 8 November 2006; see also RFR/RL Newsline, 7 
November 2006. 
35 Derived from an interview with Mr Solana by Trend, 13 November 2006; see also Zerkalo, 13 
November 2006. 
36 Azerbaijan applied for WTO membership in late June 1997, after which it has held observer status in 
the organisation. A working party on Azerbaijan’s accession was established in mid-July 1997 and the 
first round of negotiations was held in June 2002 (see http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/acc_e/a1_azerbaidjan_e.htm; accessed 21 November 2006). 14 | ELKHAN NURIYEV 
 
the rule of law. Regardless of slight progress in certain areas, disappointing developments 
include the recent elections, which fell short of a number of OSCE commitments and CoE 
democratic standards.
37 Much remains to be done to consolidate the basis for a functioning 
democracy and civil society is crucial in driving forward democratic change.
38 The rule of law is 
also a prerequisite for free trade and an open business climate and is essential for promoting 
interaction between the authorities and civil society activists. An independent media has yet to 
coalesce, and still necessitates financial support and capacity-building.  The Azerbaijani 
authorities are fully aware, however, that democracy attains its real meaning where strong 
institutions operate in a coherent and mutually reinforcing way. 
The persistence of corruption
39 has a negative impact on the effectiveness of both assistance 
programmes and foreign investment opportunities. The authorities have not yet established the 
legal mechanisms and transparent institutions needed to punish deeply ingrained fraud, and it 
remains the biggest obstacle to widespread reform. As a major factor distorting the fair 
distribution of wealth, it also increases social divisions and breeds lack of respect for authority. 
President Aliyev has repeatedly asserted the need to eradicate corruption. A campaign to clean 
up the government has been launched and many senior officials and ministers have been 
summarily dismissed, although there has been little noticeable improvement and people still 
argue that the tentacles of corruption reach the highest echelons of power. Whether or not this is 
so, it is generally acknowledged that the current level of corruption poses the largest threat to 
the democratic functioning of the country. 
Durable political stabilisation in Azerbaijan is still hampered by the conflict in Nagorno 
Karabakh, about which the EU has repeatedly expressed concern. In this regard, the EU 
welcomes the previously mentioned dialogue between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia 
and the regular meetings between the foreign ministers, hoping these negotiations will result in 
a peace deal. Many in Azerbaijan are keen to see a larger EU role in resolving the conflict. 
Compared with the OSCE and the CoE, the EU offers a unique combination of economic power 
and possibilities for solid political dialogue, adding value to conventional multilateral 
diplomacy under the OSCE’s aegis. 
After Swedish diplomat Peter Semneby became the new EUSR for the South Caucasus in 
February 2006, regional conflict resolution was given higher EU priority. In an interview, Mr 
Semneby emphasised that the EU’s mandate had been expanded,
40 thus signalling more active 
EU interest in seeing a peaceful settlement.
 In this context, he revealed the EU’s concern about 
threats of renewed hostilities in the conflict zone.
41 Recently, frequent breaches of the ceasefire 
in Nagorno Karabakh have demonstrated the fragility and instability of the situation at the front, 
even if there has been no return to full-scale hostilities. The over half million IDPs from 
Nagorno Karabakh and the surrounding districts currently occupied by Armenian forces have 
                                          
37 See OSCE/ODIHR, “OSCE/ODIHR issues its final report on elections in Azerbaijan”, Press Release, 
OSCE/ODIHR, Warsaw, 2 February 2006 (retrieved from http://www.osce.org/odihr-
elections/item_1_17922.html; accessed 20 November 2006). 
38 Since independence, civil society in Azerbaijan has grown but remains heavily dependent on Western 
support and funding. For additional information, see Freedom House Europe, Nations in Transit 2006, 
Country Reports, Freedom House Europe, Budapest, 13 June 2006. 
39 In the ratings for corruption released by Transparency International in November 2006, Azerbaijan 
ranked 130
th with a score of 2.4. According to Transparency International’s Baku office, Azerbaijan’s 
rating had risen, noting that in the previous year it had ranked 137
th. See Zerkalo, 7 November 2006; see 
also RFE/RL Newsline, 7 November 2006. 
40 See Trend, 25 March 2006. 
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become a fervent pro-war electorate,
42 nearly 84% of whom call for the use of force to reach a 
final settlement according to a 2004 opinion poll.
43 Azerbaijan’s projected defence expenditures 
for 2007 are $1 billion, up from only $135 million in 2001.
44 President Aliyev nonetheless 
seems generally faithful to supporting a peace strategy, since it is not in Azerbaijan’s economic 
interest to invoke a military solution.
45 In addition, any attempt at a military solution would 
erode the EU’s confidence in the stability of the entire region. 
Throughout 2006, the EUSR worked hard to take a direct part in conflict resolution, although 
the EU has no formal role in the peace talks over Nagorno Karabakh under the auspices of the 
OSCE Minsk Group. Under the recently altered EUSR mandate, Mr Semneby is asked not to 
assist but to contribute towards conflict settlement in the region. Perhaps most importantly, P. 
Semneby has suggested that the EU could in future assume a peacekeeping mission if a solution 
to the conflict is found.
46 Yet most politicians in Baku and Yerevan realise that a serious 
breakthrough is needed in the negotiating process to make sustainable progress in finding a 
mutually acceptable political settlement.  
The ENP Action Plan for Azerbaijan 
In March 2005, the EC recommended intensifying its relations with Azerbaijan through the 
development of an individual Action Plan under the ENP,
47 adopted in November 2006.
48 In 
turn, Azerbaijan’s leadership has responded positively to the strategic vision the Action Plan 
articulates, attaching importance to it as a tool for EU integration. 
Although the Action Plan does not hold a membership prospect, it offers practical benefits to 
both sides on many issues of shared interest and has given impetus to wide-ranging cooperation. 
As a political document, it sets out mutual, concrete commitments, some of which will help 
contribute to the further transformation of Azerbaijani society. The Action Plan creates a 
favourable foundation for the further implementation of democratic reforms, most notably 
connected with human rights and the rule of law. The commitments also extend to the economy 
                                          
42 As a result of the Armenian–Azerbaijani armed conflict during 1988–94, around 14% of Azerbaijan’s 
8.4 million people became refugees and IDPs. 
43 See the Opinion Poll Results, Baku Press Club, Baku, 2004; see also S. Freizer, “A Last Chance for 
Peace?”, in L. Broers (ed.), Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives, Issue 17, Conciliation 
Resources, London, 2005. 
44 Azerbaijan’s military spending rose from $135 million in 2001 to $300 million in 2005. After 
Armenian authorities pledged to respond accordingly with Azerbaijan’s increase, Baku vowed to spend 
$600 million on the military in 2006. For details, see Assa-Irada, the Baku-based news agency, 16 June 
2005; see also Turan, the Baku-based news agency, 17 September 2005; and also Kommersant, Moscow, 
9 November 2006. 
45 Nonetheless, the results of an opinion poll jointly conducted by several Azerbaijani non-governmental 
organisations showed that 29.1% of 1,496 respondents do not believe a peaceful resolution to the conflict 
can be found, while 27.9% believe somewhat, 24.4% would like to believe, 18.2% fully believe and 3.1% 
do not know. For details, see Association for Civil Society Development in Azerbaijan (AFSF), 365 Days 
of Ilham Aliyev’s Presidency and Civil Society – Sociological Survey, AFSF, Baku, October 2004. 
46 See T. de Waal, “EU Could Assume Peacekeeping Role”, IWPR Caucasus Report Service, CRS No. 
341, Institute for War & Peace Reporting, London, 25 May 2006. 
47 In fact, the European Commission’s recommendation was based on the Commission’s country report, 
which provided a detailed assessment of the EU–Azerbaijani relationship. See European Commission, 
“European Neighbourhood Policy: Azerbaijan”, Press Release IP/05/238, European Commission, 
Brussels, 2 March 2005. 
48 See Trend, 14 November 2006. 16 | ELKHAN NURIYEV 
 
and energy sector.
49 Despite containing some generalisations, this new document could serve as 
a road map for accomplishing broader and effective changes in the country. Clearly, the very 
demanding task of implementing the Action Plan will require Azerbaijan to undertake major 
efforts to attain European political and economic standards.  
Political stability and democratisation are the two priority areas for Azerbaijan, and are essential 
for the country to derive the full benefits from the Action Plan. Among the difficulties, 
Azerbaijan’s perceptibly weak democratic record still hampers closer relations with the EU. 
During a recent visit to Brussels, President Aliyev promised to step up political and economic 
reforms, with specific reference to the country’s political system.
50 But what matters to the EU 
are real and far-reaching results. As such, the process of reform needs to be consolidated and 
further developed in Azerbaijan, with the onus on the country’s authorities to push through 
concrete measures. Likewise, the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh continues to impede the 
European integration of both countries and the Azerbaijani leadership’s search for solutions to 
the conflict is viewed as a crucial test.  
Consequently, implementation of the Action Plan will require Azerbaijani authorities to 
demonstrate that their country shares values with the EU in practice. There is great potential for 
the deepening of the strategic partnership, which Azerbaijan should exploit. In turn, the EU 
seems ready to mobilise resources to support reforms, brought together under the new European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). It is already clear that EU assistance will be 
conditional, however, as the delivery of financial aid is linked to tangible results in the 
implementation of democratic reforms.  
EU financial assistance  
Since regaining independence in 1991, the total assistance provided by the EU to Azerbaijan has 
amounted to some €400 million. From the outset, the EU used the three principal instruments of 
TACIS, the Food Security Programme and humanitarian aid to assist refugees and IDPs, along 
with the rehabilitation of territories damaged during the armed conflict in Nagorno Karabakh.
51 
In fact, EU assistance to Azerbaijan through various projects under the TACIS programme has 
been instrumental in fostering the country’s reform efforts in a variety of spheres. Since 1998, 
the TACIS National Indicative Programme has focused on support of public sector reform and 
assistance for economic development. Following Azerbaijan’s adoption of a poverty reduction 
strategy in late 2002, the EU has also given greater emphasis to this area since early 2003.
52 The 
cooperation programme includes financial support for private sector development, in which 
assistance mainly seeks to improve the business investment climate, higher education and 
vocational training. Azerbaijan also benefits from grants under the TACIS Regional 
Programme, especially in the fields of transport, energy, the environment, and justice and home 
affairs.  
                                          
49 See European Commission, ENP Action Plan for Azerbaijan, European Commission, Brussels, 14 
November 2006 (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/azerbaidjan/intro/index.htm; 
accessed 21 November 2006). 
50 See RFE/RL Newsline, 7 November 2006; see also AzerTag, 8 November 2006. 
51 In cooperation with other international donors, the EC provided shelter and medical aid to IDPs, as well 
as rehabilitated housing, schools and rail communications in the Fizuli and Aghdam districts of 
Azerbaijan. For details, see European Commission, Azerbaijan: Country Strategy Paper 2002–2006, 
European Commission, Brussels, 27 December 2001 (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/comm/ 
external_relations/azerbaidjan/csp/index.htm; accessed 22 November 2006). 
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Since the achievement of rapid economic growth in Azerbaijan, the focus of EU assistance has 
shifted from humanitarian aid to rehabilitation programmes, to help raise living conditions for 
the IDPs and refugees. The EU sees the OSCE Minsk Group as the optimal mechanism for 
resolving the Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict and fully supports recent efforts by the leaders of 
the two countries to reach a breakthrough. If progress is made over Nagorno Karabakh, EU 
financial assistance to help alleviate tensions in the interaction between the two nations will 
grow substantially, in support of post-conflict rehabilitation, economic modernisation and 
regional cooperation. 
Replacing TACIS assistance in 2007, the ENPI will encompass all of the financial assistance 
provided under the ENP and enable the strategic partnership between the two sides to take a 
greater variety of forms. The main goal of the ENPI is to help Azerbaijan attain European 
standards in jointly agreed areas. The EU delegation travelled to Baku in the summer of 2006 
for a series of meetings with Azerbaijani officials, aimed at drafting a new National Indicative 
Programme, dealing with certain policy fields in which financial aid will be provided over 
2007–10. This timescale coincides with Azerbaijan’s implementation of the first phase of the 
ENP Action Plan, during which the country’s officials will have to prove that their commitment 
to widespread reform is genuine and goes beyond political wordplay. 
5.  Oil-rich Azerbaijan: EU influence and other external players 
Recent years have seen growing prominence given to energy-rich Azerbaijan in the foreign 
policies and national security plans of many outside powers, which are vigorously competing to 
extend their influence in the South Caucasus. Major rival powers within the region are normally 
identified as Russia, Iran, Turkey, the US and the EU, but these five are not equal and their roles 
and influences are completely different. Whereas Iran and Turkey are regional players, Russia 
remains a global power and firmly sees the US as a leading contender for advantage in the 
Caucasus. In turn, the EU takes a more or less neutral stance, albeit individual EU member 
states have their own geo-strategic interests in this post-Soviet territory. This section attempts to 
give an overview of the main tendencies in the foreign policy strategies of these powerful 
external actors.  
Regional power rivalries: Iran and Turkey 
Being significant players in the region, Iran and Turkey have a powerful impact on Caucasian 
geopolitics and Caspian geo-economics. In the case of Azerbaijan, Iran has been very cautious, 
although Tehran is evidently concerned with what happens in this post-Soviet Muslim state. The 
clerical regime seeks to prevent the emergence of a strong and pro-Western Azerbaijan, which 
would act as a galvanising force for the large community of ethnic Azerbaijanis living in Iran. 
Although constituting some 24% of the population, Iranian policies prohibit the use of the 
Azerbaijani language in schools, the press and local government, thus depriving this group of 
cultural rights. Tehran worries that increased nationalism among Azerbaijanis could threaten the 
integrity of the Iranian state, a risk that has guided Iran’s policy towards Azerbaijan.  
Tehran also realises that Azerbaijani ties with Turkey, a NATO member state, will reduce 
Iranian leverage in the region. In principle, Iran sees Turkey as a major competitor despite the 
fact that Tehran and Ankara have an important, if ambivalent relationship. The clerical regime 
feels that Turkey threatens Iran geopolitically, and opposes the spread of pan-Turkism not only 
in Azerbaijan but also throughout the Caucasus. These two regional powers are not simply in 
direct competition over influence but also represent a delicate set of geopolitical alliances in the 
region. While Ankara is strongly backed by Washington, Tehran and Moscow collaborate in the 
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the Caspian basin. Turkey has chosen Azerbaijan as its strategic ally, and Iran, in turn, 
collaborates closely with Armenia, whose relations with Turkey are hostile. 
Against this background, Iran is making every effort to play a more active role in Azerbaijan. 
Tehran’s relations with Baku are strongly affected by the continuing conflict between Iran and 
the US. Despite Tehran’s well-known anti-American policy, the Islamic Republic is trying to 
influence the political and economic shape of the region. Still, Iran’s success in Azerbaijan 
remains limited and Tehran has very little to offer Baku in terms of financial assistance or new 
technology. For these reasons, Iran has fewer possibilities to play a leading role economically in 
Azerbaijan. Iran’s ability to have a bearing on Azeri affairs through Islam is altogether another 
matter, however. Tehran actively continues to promote Islamic influence in the southern regions 
of Azerbaijan. Thus, Iran remains an important regional player, with a cultural impact on the 
Muslim people of the Caucasus.  
Meanwhile, the lure of Azeri oil and Azerbaijan’s need for transportation to Western energy 
markets adds incentives for further Turkish involvement. As such, Turkey considers Iran a 
potential rival in pipeline politics. The BTC oil pipeline and the BTE gas line have enabled 
Turkey to open a strategic window for Azerbaijan in the latter’s quest for more effective 
integration into the international community. From the outset, Ankara considered the BTC a 
valuable strategic and political asset that would highlight the country’s position as an energy 
bridge between the Caspian oil supply centre and the European market.
53 Despite its desire to 
become a major player in the negotiations between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis, Turkey’s 
role has been limited owing to Russia’s emergence as the more dominant force in the conflict 
resolution process. While both Yerevan and Baku are still unwilling to break the current 
stalemate over Nagorno Karabakh, Ankara feels that it can only have very limited say about a 
peaceful resolution to the conflict. Even in the case of renewed armed hostilities between the 
Armenians and Azerbaijanis, there is very little likelihood of a direct Turkish military 
involvement since that would probably bring the Russians and the Iranians into open conflict 
with Turkey.
54  
Unsurprisingly, Turkey’s relations with Iran have also experienced the effects of geopolitical 
competition. Both Ankara and Tehran have viewed the other’s attempts to gain political and 
economic footing in the South Caucasus with considerable suspicion. Iran has always been 
concerned that a decrease of Russian predominance in the region would result in an increase in 
Turkish advantage or in an expansion of American influence.
55 In effect, Tehran is still worried 
about Turkey’s efforts to forge close political, economic, cultural and military ties with 
Azerbaijan. Ankara regards the possibility of greater Iranian clout in Azerbaijan as an obstacle 
to its foreign policy efforts to pursue political and economic interests in the region. Even though 
the competition between Iran and Turkey over Azerbaijan has become less intense since the 
early 1990s, geopolitical concerns continue to determine their perceptions of each other’s 
regional behaviour. 
Great-power politics: Russia and the US 
The geopolitical environment in recent years has witnessed serious changes in Russian–
American relations, which came together with a revision of their role and foreign policy 
                                          
53 See T. Iskit, “Turkey: A New Actor in the Field of Energy?”, Perceptions: Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1, March–May 1996. 
54 For more on a view that suggests such a possibility, see A. Myers Jaffe and R.A. Manning, “The Myth 
of the Caspian ‘Great Game’: The Real Geopolitics of Energy”, Survival, Winter 1998–99, p. 120. 
55 See F. Halliday, “Condemned to React, Unable to Influence: Iran and Transcaucasia”, in J.F.R. Wright, 
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strategies in the South Caucasus, where the spheres of influence of the great powers overlap. In 
principle, Azerbaijan has become a strategically important country in the region, in which the 
situation is largely defined by the policy conducted by Russia and the US. Renewed US interest, 
explained by a high level of investment in Caspian basin, is taking place alongside a forceful 
return by Russia in the field of military and security cooperation and a strengthening of its 
economic and energy policies. Moscow seeks to maintain its priority links with Azerbaijan by 
means of Russia’s position in strategic sectors of the economy. The increasing number of 
cooperative agreements signed between Russia and Azerbaijan for the development of bilateral 
relations provides further evidence of this policy.  
In recent years, Russia has set out to increase its sway in Azerbaijan. Since the Putin presidency, 
however, Moscow has adopted a more pragmatic stance towards Azerbaijan, leading to a more 
constructive attitude in the OSCE Minsk Group negotiations and the role Russia is now playing 
in the peace process.
56 The Kremlin has also officially been less vocal towards an expanded 
American presence in the region. Yet, Russia’s foreign policy strategy has given abundant 
evidence to support the idea that Moscow finds the status quo convenient, and does not wish a 
quick or sustainable resolution to any conflict in the region. More specifically, the Kremlin 
seems to fear that a possible Armenian–Azerbaijani peace deal would reduce Armenia’s security 
dependence on Russia.  
The US too has extensive geopolitical and geo-economic interests in Azerbaijan, which 
intensified when American troops were ushered out of Uzbekistan. This incident affected the 
balance of power in the region and also strongly influenced the course of Azerbaijan’s foreign 
policy. Perhaps most importantly, in January 2002, the US government made a strong case for a 
waiver of Section 907 and the Pentagon embarked on a large programme of military cooperation 
with Azerbaijan.
57 Frequent visits by senior US officials to Baku during recent years point to 
American desire to build a military presence in the country. In late 2005, two American radar 
stations in Azerbaijan near the Russian and Iranian borders became operational. Moreover, a 
military centre has been set up in Baku that is capable of monitoring all shipping and aircraft 
across the Caspian Sea.  
Although the changing geopolitical situation during the past several years has made Azerbaijan 
increasingly important for US foreign policy, American strategy has thus far been grappling 
with impediments arising from Russian–Iranian geopolitical manoeuvrings that hinder any 
serious US activity in the region. The US-declared campaign against Tehran’s nuclear 
programme has increased the strategic importance of independent Azerbaijan, which is depicted 
by some American policy-makers as a geopolitical pivot.
58 As America’s role in the South 
Caucasus is currently viewed in Moscow with great anxiety, the US government has 
                                          
56 The Kremlin has strong political standing in Azerbaijan, especially in resolving the conflict over 
Nagorno Karabakh. Many in Baku recognise that resolution of the conflict is simply impossible without 
the active participation of Russia. This factor is reflected in the results of the opinion poll reported by the 
AFSF (2004, op. cit.), which indicated that 66.2% of 1,496 respondents believed Russia can help achieve 
the most rapid solution to the conflict. Some 47.4% attributed such a role to the US, 36.2% to Turkey, 
16.6% to the CoE and 10.4% to the EU. Only 8.3% believed that the OSCE could resolve the conflict.  
57 Although Section 907 sanctions have temporarily been suspended over the last several years, the US 
government has not yet managed to have the measure completely removed by Congress, hampering 
further US assistance to the country. For more on this issue, see B. Graham, “Rumsfeld Discusses Tighter 
Military Ties with Azerbaijan”, Washington Post, 4 December 2003, p. A23; see also S.F. Starr, 
Resolving Karabakh: Strategic Options for the US Government, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 
Washington, D.C., 2004. 
58 See Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, New 
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encountered Russia’s increasing reaction to alleged American-generated upheavals in the 
region, such as Georgia’s Rose Revolution of 2004. 
Presently, the foundation for current American policy in post-Soviet Azerbaijan lies firmly 
within the parameters of the new US–Russian strategic partnership in the post-11 September 
environment. Nevertheless, as Russia reasserts its position in the face of a broadening US 
presence in the South Caucasus and the Caspian basin, the entire region is emerging as an arena 
of great-power competition between Moscow and Washington. Washington is trying to prevent 
political and economic supremacy by any one rival power in oil-rich Azerbaijan. For this 
reason, the US has a keen interest in maintaining the ‘geopolitical pluralism’ of the region and 
preventing Russian ascendancy.
59 Russia is powerless to inhibit the spread of US influence in 
this post-Soviet territory. Still, Washington often reacts rather cautiously to the increasing 
pressure the Kremlin puts upon Azerbaijan, which is trying to strike a geopolitical balance 
between the two great powers.  
How Russia and the US act strategically in the South Caucasus will affect geopolitical 
alignments throughout the post-Soviet territory. The common desire of these two principal 
powers to combat global terrorism and cut off illegal trafficking is complicated by geo-strategic 
rivalry. Azerbaijan has found itself in a delicate position amidst incompatible political options, 
since Moscow perceives growing US military engagement as American expansionism in 
Russia’s natural zone of influence. In practice, these strategic options remain somewhat linked 
to fluctuations in Russian–American relations. Therefore, the Azerbaijani leadership has 
realised that closer cooperation with Russia over security matters is also vital, even if some 
aspects of Kremlin policy are uncomfortable. Even so, the near future seems to promise no way 
of establishing a common security system and embarking on integration processes in the South 
Caucasus. Unfortunately, the region has become a solid knot of great-power contradictions that 
will take decades of effort to undo. 
The EU taking a neutral stance 
The presence of important external actors has complicated EU strategic thinking on the South 
Caucasus. In terms of foreign and security policy, the EU’s role in Azerbaijan is not at all 
comparable with other principal powers such as Russia, the US, Iran and Turkey. Against these 
geopolitical players, the EU’s political engagement in Azerbaijan has been minimal. In essence, 
the EU’s foreign policy towards Azerbaijan is dominated by considerations of how European 
policies will affect EU–Russia relations. Additionally, the EU has significant differences with 
the US regarding its strategic goals in the South Caucasus. The EU does not intend to isolate 
either Russia or Iran from commercial opportunities in the Caspian basin. In contrast, the EU 
has always tried to build positive relations with both of these regional powers. Although the EU 
has no desire to become the key security actor in this region, it seeks to promote a ring of well-
governed and stable countries in Europe’s southern tier, which perfectly suits Russian and 
American interests. 
Interestingly, in recent years Germany has been the only EU member state that has tried to 
discern a fundamentally new understanding of Caucasian geopolitics. The German government 
launched a new Eastern policy (Ostpolitik) to initiate fresh cooperation with the post-Soviet 
                                          
59 In point of fact, a clear but unofficial American goal in the region is to hinder the emergence of a new 
and strongly integrated union on the territory of the CIS. In other words, US policy is aimed not simply at 
reducing Russian influence over Azerbaijan and other South Caucasian states but also putting an effective 
end to any practical hope for closer integration within the CIS. For an interesting overview on this issue, 
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states.
60 Moreover, in April 2006, the German newspaper Die Welt reported that Chancellor 
Angela Merkel would present her view on shaping a “new EU Eastern policy” with energy as a 
focal point and the Caucasus as a regional priority during Germany’s presidency of the EU in 
the first half of 2007.
61 Germany has expressed a desire to deepen its bilateral relations with 
Azerbaijan and political relations between the two countries are developing well. Particular 
German interest is given to the transportation of hydrocarbon resources from Azerbaijan to 
Europe. Evidence of widening cooperation between the two states is shown in the official visits 
of President Aliyev to Berlin, where he met with Federal President Horst Koehler and former 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, as well as with newly elected Chancellor Angela Merkel and 
other senior officials.
62 Germany is Azerbaijan’s largest and most important partner in Western 
Europe,
63 especially with respect to Azerbaijan’s integration into the European Community. 
At the same time, the stabilisation of Azerbaijan, which depends on an intensification of EU 
support for conflict resolution, is crucial given the EU’s search for greater energy independence. 
The signing of the MoU between the EU and Azerbaijan in Brussels on 7 November 2006 
enhances bilateral energy cooperation and promises to transport large volumes of oil and gas to 
the European market. The EU is also keen to cooperate with Azerbaijan on the problem of Iran. 
While the EU is trying to thwart Tehran’s ambitions to build nuclear weapons, Azerbaijan is 
seeking political support for its efforts to improve the standing of ethnic Azerbaijanis living in 
Iran. Undoubtedly, the increasing cooperation on energy matters between Azerbaijan and the 
EU and the growing strategic partnership on geopolitical concerns are likely to strengthen the 
EU’s potential presence in the Caucasus overall and in Azerbaijan in particular. This possibility 
raises an interesting, yet sensitive question, of whether the EU can afford to play a strategic 
hand in the region, which Russia still perceives as its sphere of influence. 
So far, the EU holds a neutral stance in this troubled region. Most probably, Brussels wants at 
all costs to avoid a direct conflict with Moscow, even if there are serious disagreements in the 
EU–Russian relationship. Despite growing European interest in Caspian energy sources and 
pipeline projects, the EU has not yet played any particularly prominent role in Azerbaijan. 
Surely the EU needs to become more consistent in its deployment of political tools and more 
connected to the activities of the EU member states in the region. If the EU managed to seize 
the full range of political opportunities open to it – ranging from diplomatic efforts to regional 
programmes and the provision of more active support in resolving conflicts – such actions 
would go a long way towards fostering stability and encouraging development in Azerbaijan 
and throughout the region. In the context of the ENP, the EU should endeavour in various ways 
to engender long-term stability by implementing transnational economic projects and actively 
supporting far-reaching reforms designed to promote the rule of law, combat corruption and 
                                          
60 See the International Herald Tribune, 6 October 2006. 
61 See Die Welt, 18 April 2006. 
62 In addition, German federal ministers Joschka Fischer and Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul visited 
Azerbaijan in 2001. Mr Fischer visited Azerbaijan again in 2004 and in the same year, President Aliyev 
paid an official visit to Germany. In mid-February 2007, President Aliyev visited Berlin to meet with 
Chancellor Merkel and other senior officials. In the same period, during his diplomatic tour in the South 
Caucasus, German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier arrived in Baku for meetings with top 
Azerbaijani officials and held negotiations on energy politics, conflict resolution, democratisation and 
human rights (see Zerkalo, 20 February 2007). 
63 While meeting with President Aliyev in Berlin in February 2007, Chancellor Merkel pointed out that 
the EU could improve its energy security with the support of Azerbaijan, but called on President Aliyev 
to respect democratic norms and human rights. The Azerbaijani leader promised improvements in 
accordance with the ENP Action Plan within the next five years (see Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Berlin, 15 
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organised crime, and develop the free-market economy in Azerbaijan. To this end, it is 
important that the EU supports constructive forces, within both the opposition and the 
government, mainly counting on politicians who are adequately prepared to cooperate to reform 
their country and ensure its full integration into the European Community in the long run. 
6.  Conclusions and recommendations  
Since the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU in January 2007, the South Caucasus 
has become a region of direct concern to the EU’s strategy in its wider neighbourhood, with the 
future of the South Caucasus affecting the interests of EU member states in the south-eastern 
perimeter. Instability in this increasingly strategic region presents a number of challenges 
characteristic of the post-11 September geopolitical situation. Against this background are 
specific issues related to the young countries’ political behaviour in the context of the US-led 
war against terror, the threat of renewed hostilities in conflict areas, the difficult processes of 
democratisation in fragile societies, the security of oil and gas pipelines, risks of further 
environmental degradation and humanitarian crises. Nevertheless, the EU seems to adopt a 
rather sceptical wait-and-see approach towards the region. The EU’s common foreign policy, 
albeit still in its early stages, has provided little political support for the leaders of these post-
Soviet states to address immediate national security concerns linked to separatist regions.  
Presumably, the EU acts tactically, not strategically, in the South Caucasus. Notwithstanding 
the fact that EU member states such as the UK, France, Germany and Italy are engaged in South 
Caucasus at a high level, none of them is able independently to exert substantial influence in the 
region. The fact that key member states pursue their own national foreign policies towards the 
three Caucasian countries affects the coherence of the EU’s external actions. If these European 
countries were to act in concert, the EU could become a major player in the South Caucasus – 
even the most influential one in the middle to long term. But the incapability and reluctance of 
the European powers to shape a common and articulated policy towards the South Caucasus has 
prevented them from fulfilling their potential.  
As a pivotal country in the region, Azerbaijan is a plausible location from which to influence 
economic and political trends not only in Central Asia and the Caspian basin but also in the 
Middle East, where Western democracies are in a serious quandary over Iran’s nuclear 
programme. With respect to energy and trade, the country’s oil and gas fields further reinforce 
the importance of the TRACECA route, designed to bypass the Russian Federation by crossing 
Georgian territory. Investments by major European energy companies and the growing presence 
of some EU member states demonstrate that Azerbaijan is seen today as a reliable partner with 
which the EU is trying to cultivate trade. Yet in the three main areas in which Azerbaijan affects 
Europe’s interests – energy, conflict resolution and democratisation – so far the EU has engaged 
well on a regional energy strategy, but less so on democratic reforms and almost not at all on 
conflict settlement in Nagorno Karabakh. The EU needs to balance its involvement in all three 
areas, especially given the deeper democratic changes it wishes to see in Azerbaijan. 
The EU holds all the foreign policy instruments required to promote political stability and 
economic reform, develop and strengthen democracy and the rule of law, and enhance the 
respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the small countries of the South Caucasus. 
Alongside democratic institutions such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, the EU could assert a more vigorous role in fostering good governance, democratisation 
and enduring peace through the mandate of the EUSR and the newly adopted ENP Action Plan. 
For this to occur, the EU needs a fresh, comprehensive strategy, to advance its political, security 
and economic interests in this rapidly developing region. Specific recommendations for 
formulating a common strategic vision for the South Caucasus and Azerbaijan are outlined 
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General long-term recommendations for the EU regarding the South 
Caucasus 
1)  Assert a more active EU role and enhance EU political standing in the South Caucasus 
•  Reinforce the EUSR’s regional presence in the political life of the three South Caucasian 
states. Given that the EU has a real stake in making sure that these young societies 
continue to develop, the EUSR’s role in consolidating genuine democratic changes should 
be bolstered, at least with a clear work programme on how to prevail upon the ruling 
authorities to implement European norms of governance, civil rights and the rule of law.  
•  Conduct more active information campaigns focusing on the wider public in both the EU 
and the South Caucasus. There is little information on the EU in the post-Soviet 
Caucasus. Nor is the EU public very familiar with what happens in this conflict-ridden 
part of the world. To increase public knowledge about the EU, frequent workshops and 
seminars on the history of the EU, its institutions and democratic values should be held 
under the auspices of the EUSR, alongside regular communications with the media in 
each of the three South Caucasian capitals. To raise public awareness about the South 
Caucasus in the EU, the EUSR should also prepare comprehensive annual reports on the 
three countries for dissemination to EU institutions and think tanks, and also make them 
available to major European media agencies. 
•  Examine the idea of founding an EU institute for South Caucasian studies based in 
Brussels for developing new research projects and educational exchange programmes, 
thus enhancing intellectual cooperation between the EU and the South Caucasus.  
2)  Take practical steps to contribute to conflict resolution and encourage wider public 
dialogue in the three countries 
•  Establish an expert group on regional stability in the South Caucasus, in the form of a 
regional network of Western-trained and internationally recognised scholars from each of 
the three countries. Under the aegis of the EUSR, the remit of the brainstorming group 
would be to provide considered policy recommendations and advice to both the EUSR 
and the leaderships of the three states. With reconciliation and confidence-building at the 
forefront of its agenda, the activities of the expert group could add unique value in 
preparing public opinion in the three Caucasian societies for the compromise solutions 
needed for an eventual peace settlement in the region. Perhaps most importantly, the 
establishment of such a group would demonstrate a genuine commitment on the part of 
the EUSR to contribute towards conflict resolution.  
3)  Formulate an EU–Russia–US response to regional security challenges 
•  Foster an effective response to the security challenges in the South Caucasus by working 
closely with Russia and the US. Moscow, Washington and Brussels have repeatedly 
voiced that they have no conflicting interests in this region. But stepped-up and concerted 
efforts are needed on their part to come up with a coordinated agenda to reduce 
geopolitical tensions, end territorial conflicts and build new regional security architecture. 
The nature of modern challenges leads inexorably to the increasing use of trilateral, 
cooperative security policies, which could ease divisions within the three small states and 
erect a framework for lasting peace in the post-Soviet Caucasus. 
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Policy recommendations for the EU regarding Azerbaijan 
1)  Encourage the Azerbaijani government to set out a well-defined policy for preparing 
the country’s complete integration into the EU 
•  Assist the development of a fresh, comprehensive agenda in Azerbaijan for building EU 
awareness and stimulating debates between the state-owned institutions and civil society 
organisations on closer EU relations. EU integration is a strong aspiration of the 
Azerbaijani nation. To prepare itself for becoming a full member of the EU family in the 
future, it is time to make clearer and faster decisions in this regard. 
•  Propose the establishment of a special ministry for EU integration affairs to help develop 
and implement Azerbaijan’s EU integration policy. More precisely, this ministry should 
be charged with coordinating and ensuring the implementation of the tasks specified by 
the ENP Action Plan. The creation of this ministry would increase confidence in Brussels 
that Azerbaijan clearly shares European values and that the country believes it has a 
common destiny with the EU member states. 
2)  Increase efforts to help strengthen democracy and the rule of law 
•  Prevail upon Azerbaijani authorities to promote democratisation through sustained 
reforms of the political system, which will help to consolidate the national economy. A 
major challenge facing Azerbaijan in terms of democracy is building a viable civil society 
and shoring up the rule of law. Political stability and national security will be greatly 
enhanced by increasing the transparency, effectiveness and accountability of public 
institutions. Legitimate democracy attains its real meaning where strong institutions 
operate in a coherent and mutually reinforcing way.  
•  Encourage the ruling elite to initiate profound reform of the judiciary, which is still far 
from satisfactory. It is essential to establish a reliable judicial system in accordance with 
European standards. The independence of the judiciary in Azerbaijan must be reinforced 
and a comprehensive programme is needed in order to better target corruption.  
3)  Urge Azerbaijani authorities to launch an effective campaign for combating corruption 
•  Persuade the government to elevate the fight against corruption to a high priority in 
domestic policy. Despite some common measures recently taken by the Azerbaijani 
leadership, corruption and bribery remain rampant across all spheres of life in the country. 
It is strongly recommended that the authorities establish a coordination mechanism 
involving governmental and non-governmental institutions, to detect and investigate 
possible instances of fraud. The establishment of an independent monitoring council is 
also desirable. Among other things, this council could serve as an important instrument 
for testing the accuracy of income declarations made by government officials. The EU 
should consider supporting the reform of Azerbaijan’s state-owned agencies through 
political, technical and financial sponsorship of such a public body within the 
governmental structures.  25 | 
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Glossary of Acronyms 
ADR    Azerbaijan Democratic Republic 
bcm   Billion  cubic  metres 
BTC   Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan  pipeline 
BTE    Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum pipeline  
CFSP    Common foreign and security policy  
CIS     Commonwealth of Independent States 
CoE    Council of Europe 
EBRD    European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
ENP   European  Neighbourhood  Policy 
ENPI    European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument  
EU   European  Union 
EUSR    European Union special representative 
FDI    Foreign direct investment 
GUAM   Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova   
IDPs    Internally displaced persons 
IMF   International  Monetary  Fund 
MoU    Memorandum of Understanding 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
OSCE    Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe  
PCAs    Partnership and Cooperation Agreements 
TACIS   Technical Assistance to the CIS  
TRACECA  Transport Corridor for Europe, Caucasus and Asia 
UN     United Nations 
US     United States 
WTO     World Trade Organisation About CEPS
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Founded in Brussels in 1983, the Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS) is among the 
most experienced and authoritative think 
tanks operating in the European Union today. 
CEPS serves as a leading forum for debate on 
EU affairs, but its most distinguishing feature 
lies in its strong in-house research capacity, 
complemented by an extensive network of 
partner institutes throughout the world.
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•	 To	carry	out	state-of-the-art	policy	research	leading	
to	solutions	to	the	challenges	facing	Europe	today.
•	 To	achieve	high	standards	of	academic	excellence	
and	maintain	unqualified	independence.
•	 To	provide	a	forum	for	discussion	among	all	
stakeholders	in	the	European	policy	process.
•	 To	build	collaborative	networks	of	researchers,	
policy-makers	and	business	representatives	across	
the	whole	of	Europe.
•	 To	disseminate	our	findings	and	views	through	a	
regular	flow	of	publications	and	public	events.
Assets
•	 Complete	independence	to	set	its	own	research	
priorities	and	freedom	from	any	outside	influence.
•	 Formation	of	nine	different	research	networks,	
comprising	research	institutes	from	throughout	
Europe	and	beyond,	to	complement	and	
consolidate	CEPS	research	expertise	and	to	greatly	
extend	its	outreach.
•	 An	extensive	membership	base	of	some	120	
Corporate	Members	and	130	Institutional	
Members,	which	provide	expertise	and	practical	
experience	and	act	as	a	sounding	board	for	the	
utility	and	feasability	of	CEPS	policy	proposals.
Programme Structure
CEPS	carries	out	its	research	via	its	own	in-house	
research	programmes	and	through	collaborative	
research	networks	involving	the	active	participation	of	
other	highly	reputable	institutes	and	specialists.
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Energy,	Climate	Change	&	Sustainable	Development
EU	Neighbourhood,	Foreign	&	Security	Policy
Financial	Markets	&	Taxation
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Politics	&	European	Institutions
Regulatory	Affairs
Trade,	Development	&	Agricultural	Policy
Research	Networks/Joint	Initiatives
Changing	Landscape	of	Security	&	Liberty	(CHALLENGE)
European	Capital	Markets	Institute	(ECMI)
European	Climate	Platform	(ECP)
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Institutes	(ENARPRI)
European	Network	for	Better	Regulation	(ENBR)
European	Network	of	Economic	Policy	Research	Institutes	
(ENEPRI)
European	Policy	Institutes	Network	(EPIN)
European	Security	Forum	(ESF)
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policy-makers,	academics,	corporate	executives,	NGOs	
and	the	media.	CEPS’	funding	is	obtained	from	a	
variety	of	sources,	including	membership	fees,	project	
research,	foundation	grants,	conferences	fees,	publi-
cation	sales	and	an	annual	grant	from	the	European	
Commission.